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Abstract 
On the modern web, many sites have third party content, be it through maps, embedded 
objects, ads, or through other types. Users pay little attention to the source of this content since it 
is such a common occurrence. Unfortunately, this content can be an avenue for third parties to 
discover private information about the user. Previous work has found these types of leaks in 
social networking sites. By logging headers during the usage of 120 sites across 12 major 
categories, we were able to find leakage of a user‘s private information occurring on many other 
types of popular web sites. We found leakage on 75% of the sites we looked at and at least one 
instance in each of the categories. Based on the leaks we found, we propose a classification of 
the types of leakage that can occur via the HTTP header and use this system to analyze our 
results. 
  
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
First of all, I would like to thank the people who made my thesis possible. The largest part of 
the credit has to go to my advisor, Prof. Craig Wills, for helping me accomplish my goals for this 
project and keeping me on schedule. Without him I would have been utterly lost and would not 
be able to accomplish half of what I did. I would also like to thank my reader, Prof. Kathryn 
Fisler. Without her, this report would not be possible and all my work would be meaningless 
since I would be stuck in grad school for ever. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Balachander 
Krishnamurthy for providing feedback on this work, acting as an outside view on the 
methodology, and co-authoring a paper which will bring these results to the masses. 
I would also like to thank everyone who I have met at WPI over the last four and a half years. 
I would like to thank the professors who taught me the classes I will need to succeed in the real 
world and tolerating the occasional late homework. I would like thank the TAs for providing 
comprehensible explanations of the professors‘ lessons and grading the above mentioned 
homeworks. I would like to thank my classmates past and present. They provided me with 
countless hours of amusement and made sitting in a lab and working on homework assignments 
palatable. I would like to specifically thank the classmates with whom I have had the fortune of 
doing group work. They provided the best of times and the worst of times. 
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for tolerating not seeing me for weeks as 
worked on the various projects that I required for the completion of my degrees, especially as I 
worked to finish this thesis. 
  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments..................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Figures ........................................................................................................................ v 
Table of Tables ......................................................................................................................... v 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Background ...................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 What is Private Information ...................................................................................... 3 
2.2 Leakage of Private Information ................................................................................ 4 
2.2.1 User Opinions of Leakage ................................................................................................. 4 
2.3 Threat Posed by Leakage on the Web....................................................................... 5 
2.4 Preventive Measures ................................................................................................. 6 
2.4.1 Cookie management .......................................................................................................... 6 
2.4.2 Network Anonymizers ...................................................................................................... 6 
2.4.3 Browser Plugins ................................................................................................................ 7 
2.5 Summary ................................................................................................................... 7 
3 Study Design .................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Selecting Categories and Sites .................................................................................. 9 
3.2 Gathering Site Interactions ..................................................................................... 11 
3.3 Summary ................................................................................................................. 14 
4 Analysis of Leaks ........................................................................................................... 15 
4.1 Types of Leakage .................................................................................................... 15 
4.1.1 Leakage via Cookies ....................................................................................................... 15 
iv 
 
4.1.2 Leakage via Request URL .............................................................................................. 16 
4.1.3 Leakage via Referer ........................................................................................................ 17 
4.1.4 Leakage via Title ............................................................................................................. 17 
4.1.5 Leakage during Signup ................................................................................................... 18 
4.1.6 Leakage of Search Terms ................................................................................................ 19 
4.1.7 Indirect Leakage .............................................................................................................. 19 
4.2 Leakage by Category .............................................................................................. 20 
4.3 Bits Leaked ............................................................................................................. 22 
4.4 Leaked Bits‘ Recipients .......................................................................................... 23 
4.5 Summary ................................................................................................................. 25 
5 Conclusions and Future Work ........................................................................................ 27 
Appendices .............................................................................................................................. 35 
A. List of Sites in Each Category .................................................................................... 35 
B. Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 37 
 
  
v 
 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1 Leakage of Email Address, Full Name, and Zip Code to a Hidden Third Party ...... 16 
Figure 2 Leakage of Gender and Age via a Request .............................................................. 16 
Figure 3 Leakage of Email Address via Referer ..................................................................... 17 
Figure 4 Leakage of the User‘s Full Name via Title .............................................................. 18 
Figure 5 Leakage of Email during Signup .............................................................................. 18 
Figure 6 Leakage of a Health Issue as a Search Term ............................................................ 19 
Figure 7 Leakage of a User‘s Profile That Allows Indirect Leakage ..................................... 20 
Table of Tables 
Table 1 Total Sites with Leakage in Each Category ............................................................... 21 
Table 2 Types of Direct Leakage in Each Category ............................................................... 22 
Table 3 Bits Leaked and Counts of Sources and Destinations ............................................... 23 
Table 4 Top 10 Third-Party Recipients of Private Bits from Direct Leakage ........................ 24 
 
  
1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Due to the interconnected nature of the World Wide Web, it is easy for a site to access 
content from any number of third-party sites. It is done through embedded objects such as videos 
and maps, hotlinked images, ads, external JavaScript imports, or any number of other ways. In 
all of these cases, a user‘s browser loads content from a third-party1 site without any explicit 
action on the part of the user. Each time the content is loaded, it presents an opportunity for a 
user‘s private information such as name, email address, hometown, or buying habits to leak to 
the third party hosting it. Due to the ability of a website to repost this information to a trusted site 
via an API such as Facebook Connect, there is another avenue for information to leak. This 
threat is increased even further when using smart phones due to the ability of modern phones to 
provide the exact location of a user to an application. 
We had previously looked at the work of Krishnamurthy, Wills, et al [1,2,3] as well as 
assisted in data gathering for [3]. Their work looked at the leakage of private information to third 
parties on social networking sites. Based on their results and our contributions to their data, we 
saw an opportunity to apply a similar methodology to look at other categories of sites and 
compare the results from those sites to social networks. Though none of the categories that we 
looked at stored as much information as social networking sites, it is still possible for the 
                                                 
 
1
 We use ‗third-party‘ to refer to a site, other than the one that the user is looking at, that provides content that is 
displayed on the page. We use the domain name to decide if content is third-party. Content coming from the same 
host as the page the user is looking at is ‗first-party‘. Content not hosted on the same domain is third-party. 
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information that these sites do have to leak. Because of the degree to which leakage occurred on 
social networks, we conjectured that we would be able to find similar types of leakage across 
other categories of sites. 
In this thesis, we explain our study as well as look at our results. We begin with Chapter 2 
looking at the context of our problem. In particular, we focus on defining what is private 
information, what constitutes leakage of it, and what solutions exist to prevent such leakage. We 
then discuss our methodology in Chapter 3. We look at selecting categories and sites to look at. 
We also look at how we gathered data for each site. We continue with Chapter 4 containing the 
Analysis of Leaks. In this chapter we cover the types of leaks that we found, the frequency of 
leakage in each of the categories, and the recipients of data that is leaked. Our last paper chapter, 
Chapter 5, is Conclusions. In it, we evaluate our hypothesis and look at future work. Finally we 
include Appendices containing a full list of sites that we looked at and a glossary of terms that 
we use in this paper for the benefit of the reader.  
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2 Background 
2.1 What is Private Information 
In order to study leakage of private information, we first need to decide what is private 
information. We define it as any personal information about the user as well as any information 
that the user gives to a site that the user may not like to be widely known. To define personal 
information, we turn to literature. A directive by the European Parliament [4] defines it as 
―information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person‖. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, an agency of the US government, defines personally identifiable 
information ―any information about an individual…, including (1) any information that can be 
used to distinguish or trace an individual‗s identity … and (2) any other information that is 
linked or linkable to an individual‖ [5]. In both cases, personal information is defined as 
including any information that can be associated with a given user. This information should not 
be limited to data that uniquely identifies an individual (referred to as identified data [6]). There 
are studies [7] showing that several pieces of data that do not separately identify a user can be 
combined to do so. This type of data is referred to as identifiable data [6]. Information that we 
felt a user would not want widely known includes medical information that the user was 
interested in, travel arrangements that the user was making, and the hobbies of the user. 
We define a private information bit as a single datum of private information. It is a fact that 
a user can disclose to one or more websites and it is the smallest amount of information that 
could be known. Examples include a birth year or zip code. 
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2.2 Leakage of Private Information 
We define leakage of private information as any situation in which a user‘s private 
information is disclosed to a third party without a user explicitly requesting such disclosure. 
Leakage is a well-known occurrence [6]. Despite the negative attitude about it, in many instances 
it is considered an unwanted, but tolerated menace. In the US, both the NIST [5] and Office of 
Management and Budget [8] have warned government agencies about the dangers of breaches of 
personally identifiable information. In 1995, the European Union has defined the privacy of 
one‘s personal information as being a fundamental human right [4]; it reiterated and strengthened 
their stance in 2010[9]. 
2.2.1 User Opinions of Leakage 
Over the years, there have been numerous studies that focused on user opinions about 
companies harvesting user information. More than 80% of Americans report having a negative 
opinion of corporations collecting private information [10] and 82% of Europeans have little 
trust in the Web with private information [11,12]. Studies found that, if given the option, users 
will pay a relatively small premium on an item if they feel that they are buying from a more 
secure retailer [13]. Several studies implied that users found the practice of harvesting user 
information and storing it in a database for future marketing purposes to be unethical [14,15]. 
More than 90% of Europeans seem to agree, since they do not approve of the usage of their 
private information for targeted ads [11]. The most shocking studies are those discovering that 
users are not aware of the full extent of leakage of their private data [16,17]. 
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2.3 Threat Posed by Leakage on the Web 
Subsection 2.2 establishes that the leakage of private information is generally regarded as a 
negative event. The next logical step is to look at how the Web can act as an avenue for a user‘s 
private information to be gathered and leaked. As noted in [7], it is possible to collect bits of 
private information from various sources to build a more complete profile of the user. One of the 
common ways to unite multiple bits is to use a persistent cookie in the browser as a user 
identifier [18]. The frequency with which it occurs has prompted the World Wide Web 
Consortium to add a note on how to inform users about it in their specification for machine 
readable privacy policies[19]. Another way to gather private information about a user is by 
inferring it from user history as demonstrated by [20]. Third parties can gather a user‘s history 
either by tracking the user‘s cookie or by using a well-known CSS exploit [21] that is not likely 
to be fixed in the foreseeable future [22]. Location bits about the user can be inferred from the IP 
address [20,3]. This research shows yet another way that bits of private information can get into 
the hands of third parties. All of these bits can be combined by a third party to form a profile of 
the user. 
Once all of these bits of private information are gathered, they can be used for purposes such 
as targeted advertising. The practice of targeted advertising involves using a user profile to 
display ads that are believed to appeal to the interests of the user. The practice is assumed to be 
widely used by advertisers [23,24]. It has also been shown that the ads shown to a user in 
targeting advertising may expose information about the user to the advertised company [24]. 
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2.4 Preventive Measures 
For all of the threats to private information, there exist countermeasures. Unfortunately, none 
of the solutions are perfect. For all of them, the biggest issue is that users do not use them [25]. 
2.4.1 Cookie management 
If users are concerned about being tracked using cookies, they can manually delete cookies 
regularly or choose not to accept them at all. Unfortunately, taking any of these actions can 
degrade the user experience as noted in [26]. It is also not effective in every case. The users can 
still be tracked by using alternative cookie implementations through technologies like Flash local 
shared objects [18]. The users can also be tracked using browser fingerprinting as demonstrated 
by [27,20] or simply though the IP address.  
2.4.2 Network Anonymizers 
Another preventive measure is to anonymize the user‘s connection through technologies such 
as Tor [28] and a HTTP proxy front end like Privoxy
2
. The weakness of this method is that it is 
protocol agnostic. Being protocol agnostic means that it only stops leakage at the network layer, 
but does not stop any leakage at the HTTP level, which includes most of the leakage that we 
mentioned. It stops IP address leakage, which can be used to infer the user‘s location or track a 
session. 
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 http://www.privoxy.org/ 
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2.4.3 Browser Plugins 
There exist a number of browser plugins that are capable of blocking advertisements and 
filtering JavaScript. Popular choices include Adblock Plus
3
 and NoScript
4
. Like disabling 
cookies, these plugins can hurt the user experience [26]. Since they stop third-party ads from 
loading, they likely interfere with a sites ability to sell advertising space. This interference has 
ethical implications, since the user is getting the website contents without the site owner being 
paid [29]. It also falls into a legal gray area, since the user may be making an unauthorized 
modification to the intellectual property of the site‘s author [29,30]. There exists a theoretical 
solution proposed by [31] that involves the user running an ad server locally. This solution 
eliminates any leakage since none of the user‘s information leaves the local machine. The system 
requires a complicated infrastructure to distribute the ads to all the local servers, verify the 
authenticity of ad responses, and to make sure that a user‘s actions are truly kept secure. 
2.5 Summary 
We define private information as a user‘s personal information as well as any other 
information that a user does not want to be widely known. From literature, we chose a definition 
of personal information that included both information that identifies a user, and information that 
can be linked to a user. Again, to match literature, we chose to define leakage of personal 
                                                 
 
3
 http://adblockplus.org 
4
 http://noscript.net/ 
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information to be any instance of a user‘s private information being revealed to a third party 
without the consent of the user. Based on this definition, we found evidence of both legal and 
popular support for the limiting of such leakage. We also showed how instances of leakage can 
occur during usage of the World Wide Web and how multiple instances can be combined to get a 
more complete profile of the user. Finally, we discussed several popular solutions for preventing 
leakage, but noted that all of them had significant drawbacks. In the following chapters, we 
demonstrate another avenue for leakage to occur on the Web. 
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3 Study Design 
The intent of our study was to look at how prominent privacy leakage was on a number of 
popular categories of sites. Looking at a variety of sites would allow us to compare the different 
categories to see if visiting certain types of sites puts a user in greater risk of privacy leakage. 
We could also look at the overall privacy leakage on the World Wide Web (by examining what 
portion of the categories show potential for leakage). Once we had selected a set of categories 
and the sites within each category that we would be looking at, we designed a uniform way to 
look at the type of information that would be leaked about the user when the site was used. 
3.1 Selecting Categories and Sites 
One of the first issues that we encountered with the project was to find an objective way to 
select a set of categories and the sites within them while still having a set of sites that were of 
research interest. The first step to accomplishing this task was to set up several criteria that every 
site that we would look at would need to fulfill. The first criterion was that the site must collect 
enough information about a user so that it would have something to leak. We insured this 
criterion was satisfied by only looking at sites that allowed a user to create an account on the site 
and making sure that the site offers additional functionality exclusive to users who created 
accounts. Another criterion was that the sites must have a large enough population of users about 
whom they have data. To verify this criterion, we tried to find information about the number of 
registered users on the site and only look at sited with at least 100,000 registered users (although 
for most of the sites that we decided to include, the number was in the millions). In general, the 
number of users on a site was a self-reported statistic. We were not able to find this information 
10 
 
 
about all the sites, but those that we allowed were popular sites in a category where other sites 
had significant populations. Our third criterion was that each site must offer functionality and 
features consistent with other sites in its category. For categories in which we found more than 
one popular set of functionality, we selected the set of sites which included the most popular 
ones. Our final criterion was that the site could be studied without disclosing too much about 
who we were. This criterion excluded sites that required a method of payment to create an 
account or ones that verified identity beyond an email address. 
We based our categories on the categories and sub-categories used by Alexa
5
, a site 
popularity ranking. We filtered the categories and sub-categories to find ones that had 10 sites 
fulfilling our criteria near the top of the listing. Categories in which we could not find ten sites 
matching our criteria among the top sites were dropped. Using Alexa insured that the sites in 
each category were the most popular ones that we could look at. Using this procedure, we came 
up with a list of ten categories that we wanted to look at: Arts, Employment, Video Game News 
and Reviews, Photo Sharing, News, Travel, Shopping, Relationships, Generations and Age 
Groups, and Sports.  
In addition to these ten categories, we included two more in our study. One was Online 
Social Networks (OSN) since they were look at previously in [3] and since the sites have huge 
numbers of registered. We used the same criteria for site selection as the other categories and 
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 http:// www.alexa.com 
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gathered fresh usage for all the OSN sites. The other category that we decided to add was Health. 
We wanted to include this category because of the sensitivity of the information that a user 
provides to a health site. This information is of a private nature and if it were to be leaked to 
third parties, it could be combined with other information about the user and hurt the user in 
pursuits such as finding employment or purchasing insurance. To allow for the inclusion of this 
category, we needed to loosen the requirement of sites allowing users to register. Some the 
popular sites in this category do not allow user registration but still have plenty of private 
information about the user because the sites have other private information, such as search terms, 
that are of interest to third parties. We created an account on these sites as well if doing so was 
possible. 
3.2 Gathering Site Interactions 
Once we had established a list of sites, we worked to create a log of typical interactions 
between the site and a user. The approach that we used is the same one that was used by [2]. We 
set up a browser to route all of its traffic through the Fiddler Web proxy
6
. There was a set of 
actions that was common to almost all sites that we made sure to do. We started by creating an 
account. We would then confirm any verification emails, as appropriate. We would try to create 
and edit our user profile if the site provided one. We would then explore the capabilities offered 
by the site to registered users. The actions we looked at often included browsing the contents of 
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 http://www.fiddler2.com/fiddler2/ 
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the site, using any search capabilities that the site offered, and posting comments on and reviews 
of the site contents. Many sites offered a ―remember me‖ functionality. When one was present, 
we selected it, as many sites implement the feature by storing private information in a cookie 
(which can be leaked to a third party). There were many other capabilities that varied by 
category that we tried: 
 Arts: While accessing videos or music we used play/pause/resume when appropriate. 
We also posted comments about content and personalized the site with favorites as 
only registered users are allowed to do so. 
 Employment: Uploaded resumes, searched and applied for jobs, and signed up for 
email alerts. 
 Video Game News and Reviews: Registered users alone can review and comment on 
games, add games to a list of owned games, and join groups. Beyond these actions we 
read and contributed to forums available for users to interact with each other. 
 Photo Sharing: Created a photo gallery, uploaded and commented on images, shared 
images with guests. We also participated in user communities if present. 
 News: Took advantage of registered users‘ capabilities such as commenting on 
articles and marking articles as favorites. 
 Travel: Read recommendations and information about destinations, booked travel 
arrangements (without actual payment), and saved flight itineraries. 
 Shopping: Added items to a shopping cart (no actual purchases done), looked for a 
―nearest store‖ for sites with physical stores, and created a wish list when possible. 
13 
 
 
 Relationships: Took compatibility quiz, browsed local area members, and tried to 
contact examined matches. 
 Generations and Age Groups: Joined groups/forums and posted comments, 
participated in contests for registered users. 
 Sports: Looked at sports scores, read articles, and viewed video clips. As a registered 
user we commented on articles, checked on ―favorite‖ teams, and participated in 
fantasy sports contests. 
 OSN: Used results obtained as part of [3], which included viewing user profiles, 
searching for friends, posting messages, uploading photos and installing/running 
external OSN applications. 
 Health: Searched for and browsed health conditions, participated in surveys and took 
quizzes. As a registered user we used community features and posted comments. 
There were some additional actions that, though not common to any category of sites, we 
encountered occasionally and took advantage of when we did. When a site had a forum, we read 
topics and contributed to the discussion. If a site had the ability to link a user‘s account on this 
site to an account on another site, we took advantage of it. This feature creates the potential that 
the login information from the other site is stored by this one and subsequently leaked. Some 
sites offered the ability to share an article or post from this site on another one; we tried this 
action for similar reasons. 
Once we had session information from all of the sites, we looked through all of the headers 
as well as POST data for user ids, user names, and pieces of private information that were getting 
14 
 
 
sent to third parties. These headers included bits such as full name, zip code, and email address. 
For the most part, these searches could be done in an automated fashion, but we did need to 
eliminate false positives by hand and some bits, such as gender, had to be searched for through 
manual inspection. This process gave us a listing of all leaks to third parties as well as how the 
information was leaked and all the recipients of it. 
 There are a number of reasons for us to not be able to observe a leak. Though we search 
for common strings in our logs, there is a chance that the string was passed in such a way as to 
not match our regular expressions. We did not have a way to decode encrypted transmission such 
as SSL. We did not have a way to read data that was encrypted by a script before it was stored or 
transmitted. It is important to note that we could only analyze the leaks that we observed. As 
such, our results are the lower bound of information that leaked. 
3.3 Summary 
To measure privacy leakage on the World Wide Web, we decided to look at 12 popular 
categories of sites. From each category, we selected the 10 most popular sites that gather and 
store user information. On each of the sites, we created a user account and carried out the types 
of actions that would be done by users on that site. All of our interactions were logged by a 
proxy. We then inspected those logs to see if we could find any evidence of users‘ private 
information being leaked. Our findings are discussed in the next chapter.  
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4 Analysis of Leaks 
There were several types of information that we were looking for in the site data that we 
collected. One was a way to classify the type of leakage that we observe. Another was to look at 
how prominent leakage was in each of the categories that we looked at.  A final one was to look 
at the recipients of the data. 
4.1 Types of Leakage 
The most obvious types of leakage that we saw occurring was what we refer to as direct 
leakage. This type of leakage is leakage that results in one or more bits of a user‘s private 
information being transferred in plain text form to a third party as part of an HTTP header. There 
are a number of ways that this leakage can occur. The six that we have found in the sites that we 
looked at are: leakage via cookies, leakage via request URL, leakage via referer, leakage via title, 
leakage during signup, and leakage of search terms. 
4.1.1 Leakage via Cookies 
Leakage via cookies occurs when the user‘s cookies are sent to a site other than the one that 
set them. Many of the sites that we looked at store some private bits in the cookies, so when a 
cookie are leaked, any information stored in it is leaked as well. Cookies generally leak because 
some metrics companies, most notably Omniture, have a sub-domain of the sites main domain 
redirect to one of their servers. Borrowing the term from [32] we refer to these sites as hidden 
third parties. The user‘s browser, assuming that the sub-domain is the same site as the main 
site, sends any cookies associated with the domain to the sub-domain. An example of this 
16 
 
 
leakage is in Figure 1 (note that the private information being leaked is shown in a bold font in 
all the leakage examples). In it we see that aarp.org, one of the sites in the Age Groups category, 
stores the user‘s email address, full name, and zip in a cookie sent to metrics.aarp.org. A DNS 
lookup reveals that the sub-domain points to 207.net (which is one of Omniture‘s domains). 
 
Figure 1 Leakage of Email Address, Full Name, and Zip Code to a Hidden Third Party 
4.1.2 Leakage via Request URL 
Leakage via request URL occurs when the user loads a third-party site URL that contains 
some bits of the user‘s private information. This type of leakage generally occurs because the site 
that the user is visiting puts information into the URLs of scripts, images, or multimedia 
embedded within a page. This type of leakage can be seen when the information is an argument 
passed via GET to a third-party script. An example of this type leakage is presented in Figure 2. 
In it, we see that webshots.com, one of the sites in the Photo Sharing category, passes the user‘s 
age and gender to doubleclick.net.  
 
Figure 2 Leakage of Gender and Age via a Request 
GET: http://ad.doubleclick.net/ … a=25;g=M;dcopt=ist;sz=300x250;ord=72457? 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net 
Referrer: http://community.webshots.com/myphotos? ... 
Cookie: id=22ac58d7fe00001d … 
GET: http://metrics.aarp.org/b/ss/aarpglobal/... 
Host: metrics.aarp.org 
Referrer: http://www.aarp.org/ 
Cookie: ...a=jdoe&e=jdoe@email.com&f=John 
&l=Doe&...&p=12201... 
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4.1.3 Leakage via Referer 
Leakage via referer occurs when the sites that the user is looking at contains bits of private 
information in the URL. This information could be there because the information is being passed 
by the site via a GET request, because the site got the information due to leakage via request 
URL, or because the URL just happens to contain a bit of private information in it. Any pages 
linked to by the current page as well as any images, media, or scripts embedded in the current 
page get the pages URL in the referer field when loaded. Figure 3 is an example of this type of 
leakage. We see guardian.co.uk leaking the user‘s email address to scorecardresearch.com. The 
leakage occurs because both bits of private information occur in the URL of the page that the 
user is looking at. 
 
Figure 3 Leakage of Email Address via Referer 
4.1.4 Leakage via Title 
Leakage via title is a special case of other types of leakage. It is leakage that occurs when 
one or more bits of private information are displayed in the title of a page. Some third-party 
scripts record the title of the page that is calling them. These scripts end up recording the private 
information in the title. In Figure 4 we see an example. Hulu, one of the sites in the Arts 
category, puts the user‘s full name in the title of a page. JavaScript code running on the page 
GET: http://b.scorecardresearch.com/r?c2=6035250&d.c=gif… 
Host: b.scorecardresearch.com 
Referrer: http://users.guardian.co.uk/mydetails? 
AU_LOGIN_ID=jdoe%40email%2ecom&AU_PASSWORD=%2d%2
d%2d%2d%2d%2d&AU_PASSWORD_HASH=d0c9811d9f103499080
041d756840fdb… 
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takes the title and passes it as an argument to another script via request URL. Note that the page 
is also leaking the user‘s Hulu user id via the referer. 
 
Figure 4 Leakage of the User’s Full Name via Title 
4.1.5 Leakage during Signup 
Leakage during signup is another special case of other types of leakage (generally leakage 
via request URL or leakage via referer). It is of interest because it is leakage specific to actions 
performed during signup. Due to the information that the user reveals to a site during account 
creation and setting up a profile, it has a lot of potential to leak a large amount of sensitive user 
information. Leakage during signup also includes leaks of verification email contents by a site, 
which may contain user name, email, or password. Figure 5 is an example of this type of 
leakage. When the user creates an account with criticinfo.com, which is part of the Sports 
category, the user is sent a confirmation email. When the user attempts to confirm the account, 
the user‘s email is included in the URL of the confirmation page and is leaked to doubleclick.net 
via referer. 
 
Figure 5 Leakage of Email during Signup 
GET http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/... 
Host: ad.doubleclick.net 
Referer: http://submit.cricinfo.com/member mgmt/.../confirm.html? email=jdoe@email.com 
Cookie: id=35c192bcfe0000b1... 
GET http://beacon.scorecardresearch.com/... c8=Hulu - John Doe‘s profile... 
Host: beacon.scorecardresearch.com 
Referer: http://www.hulu.com/profile/public/|123456789... 
Cookie: UID=7c91325-215.167.49.28-1325396156 
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4.1.6 Leakage of Search Terms 
Leakage of search terms is one more special case of other types of leakage. It is leakage, 
generally via referer, of a user‘s search terms when a user performs a search on a site. It is 
noteworthy because of the data that it is leaking. Most other leakage that we saw was leaking 
information stored in the profile of the user. Search terms may contain information that a user 
would not normally want to list in his or her profile. We see an instance of this type of leakage in 
Figure 6. In the figure the user‘s search for the term ―pancreatic cancer‖ on menshealth.com, one 
of the Health sites at which we looked, is being leaked to a third party. Users may not want these 
types of sensitive search terms associated with them. 
 
Figure 6 Leakage of a Health Issue as a Search Term 
4.1.7 Indirect Leakage 
Not all leakage that we observed fit our definition of direct leakage. This other type of 
leakage was classified as being indirect. Indirect leakage occurs when information is passed to a 
third party that is not in itself private information, but can be used to access private information. 
This category consisted of information that could be used to access the profile of the user to 
extract more information. The information that this type of leakage can potentially reveal may be 
lessened significantly by a user setting aggressive privacy settings on sites. By the same token, 
an overly trusting user can potentially leak a large amount of information this way. The leakage 
in Figure 7 is of this type. Filipinaheart.com, one of the sites in the Relationships category, leaks 
GET http://pixel.quantserve.com/pixel;r=1423312787... 
Host: pixel.quantserve.com 
Referer: http://search.menshealth.com/search.jsp?q=pancreatic+cancer 
Cookie: mc=6d43124b-c39f1-37621-f4c82; ... 
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a user‘s user id which can be used to access the user‘s profile. From that profile, the third party 
can get access to a user‘s city of residence, age, a photo of the user, and details about the user‘s 
sexual orientation, among other bits of information. 
 
Figure 7 Leakage of a User’s Profile That Allows Indirect Leakage 
4.2 Leakage by Category 
Once we had established the leakage types, we looked at the frequency with which each type 
occurs in our data. Table 1 shows the count of sites, out of the 10 in each category, that have 
leakage to a third party. The categories have counts for how many sites have direct leakage, how 
many have indirect leakage, and how many have any leakage, whether it is direct or indirect. All 
of the categories had instances of both direct and indirect leakage and most categories had some 
kind of leakage on at least half of the sites we looked at. The sole exception is shopping. This 
exception exists largely because shopping sites only have user information to expedite checkout. 
It is also because shopping sites have a source of revenue other than advertising, so they tend to 
have fewer ads than sites in many of the other categories. Out of the 120 sites in the categories, 
90 of them had some sort of leakage and 67 had direct leakage. These numbers strongly support 
our hypothesis that we would be able to find leakage across many different categories of sites.  
Most of the categories that ended up near the top of the list did so largely due to direct 
leakage. The Health, Travel, and Employment categories all had much more direct leakage than 
indirect. In contrast, both the Video Game News and Review and the Generations and Age 
GET: http://srv2.wa.marketingsolutions.yahoo.com/script/… 
Host: marketingsolutions.yahoo.com 
Referer: http://www.filipinaheart.com/en/profile/showProfile/ID/2615448 
Cookie: SYSTEM_USER_ID=IHMBUANTOK95NIO69AB3A9R6MO… 
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Groups categories had significantly more indirect leakage than direct leakage. This contrast 
seems to suggest indirect leakage and direct leakage are independent of one another. The 
categories that had a majority of sites with indirect leakage (OSNs, Video Game News and 
Reviews, Arts, Generations and Age Groups, and Relationships) all have profiles as major 
features. The categories that do not have indirect leakage on most sites (Health, Sports, News, 
Travel, and Shopping) were all categories where a profile is not a noteworthy feature, if it is even 
present. This result supports the obvious idea that having a profile with user information in it can 
cause that user information to be leaked. 
Table 1 Total Sites with Leakage in Each Category 
Category Direct 
Leakage 
Indirect 
Leakage 
Any 
Leakage 
Online Social 
Networks 
7 10 10 
Relationships 7 6 10 
Health 9 4 9 
Travel 9 1 9 
Employment 8 2 8 
Arts 7 7 8 
Video Game 
News and 
Reviews 
2 8 8 
Sports 4 4 7 
Generations 
and Age 
Groups 
2 7 7 
News 5 3 6 
Photo Sharing 4 5 5 
Shopping 3 1 3 
Total 67 58 90 
Since we had further classifications of direct leakage and since direct leakage is more 
obviously an issue, we looked at the type of direct leakage that occurred on each site. The results 
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are summarized in Table 2. The categories are sorted in order of how many of the sites exhibit 
direct leakage. The numbers are a count of how many of the sites in a given category showed this 
type of leakage. The Any column is the same as the Direct Leakage column in the previous table. 
Again, a majority of categories have leakage on at least half of their sites. Both travel and health 
are at the top of the list due to leakage of search terms. 
Table 2 Types of Direct Leakage in Each Category 
Category Any Leakage 
via 
Cookies 
Leakage 
via 
Request 
URL 
Leakage 
During 
Signup 
Leakage 
via 
Referer 
Leakage 
via Title 
Leakage 
of Search 
Terms 
Health 9 1 0 0 0 0 9 
Travel 9 0 1 0 0 0 9 
Employment 8 0 2 0 5 2 4 
Online Social 
Networks 
7 0 3 0 0 5 0 
Arts 7 0 3 0 1 4 0 
Relationships 7 0 3 0 0 2 2 
News 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 
Photo Sharing 4 1 2 3 1 0 0 
Sports 4 2 0 1 1 0 0 
Shopping 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 
Video Game 
News and 
Reviews 
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Generations 
and Age 
Groups 
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Total 67 11 16 4 9 13 25 
4.3 Bits Leaked 
After looking at where leakage is coming from and where it is going, the next result to look 
at is what bits are getting leaked. Table 3 contains a list of all bits that we saw leaked ordered by 
how many sites leak the bit. The table shows how many distinct sites that we looked at leaked 
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the bit and how many distinct third parties received the bit from one or more sites. Among the 
top bits, we see bits that uniquely identify the user, such as full name which was leaked from 20 
out of the 120 sites we looked at and was sent to 20 different third parties. We also see bits that 
are not unique to a given user, such as age, which leaked from 21 sources to 22 destinations. 
Notable bits include medical and travel related searches. They are only leaked by 9 out of the 10 
sites in their respective categories but end up being sent to more destinations than almost every 
other bit. 
Table 3 Bits Leaked and Counts of Sources and Destinations 
Bit First-
Party 
Sources 
Third-Party 
Destinations 
age 21 22 
full name 20 20 
zip code 18 29 
gender 16 20 
city 16 19 
email address 15 16 
medical searches 9 30 
travel related 
searches 
9 25 
occupation 4 8 
home address 3 9 
hobbies 3 1 
college 2 6 
home phone 2 3 
employer 1 6 
4.4 Leaked Bits’ Recipients 
Once we establish what categories are leaking data, the next logical question to ask is what 
sites are receiving these leaks. Table 4 lists the top 10 leak recipients of direct leakage, in order 
24 
 
 
of the number of sites leaking to them. It also includes the number of sites that leak to this third 
party and the number of bits of private information that are leaked. Overall, the distribution of 
recipients has a few receivers with a large number of leaks going to them and many receivers 
that only get information from a few sites. Missing from this table are content delivery networks, 
such as Akamai. Though they host content on a server external to the site the user is looking at, 
the content was still generated by the first-party. We also excluded servers that are owned by the 
same company as the site the user is looking at and used to host content related to the site. 
Table 4 Top 10 Third-Party Recipients of Private Bits from Direct Leakage 
Third-Party Domain First-
Party 
Sites 
Leaking 
Bits 
Received 
doubleclick.net 27 13 
google-analytics.com 24 11 
scorecardresearch.com 18 7 
omniture.com 17 8 
atdmt.com 12 9 
yieldmanager.com 9 11 
2mdn.net 9 9 
quantserve.com 8 8 
collective-media.net 6 8 
2o7.net 4 7 
DoubleClick, an advertising subsidiary of Google, is the top recipient of direct leakage. It is 
getting data from 27 separate sites out of our 120. The bits leaked were: city, zip code, hobbies, 
gender, age, travel related searches, employer, occupation, college, address, full name, medical 
searches, and email address. DoubleClick received all but one of the bits that we saw leaked by 
sites. The only bit that it did not receive was the user‘s phone number. The second largest 
recipient was Google Analytics, which got 11 bits of information from 24 sites. The bits were: 
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city, zip code, gender, age, travel related searches, occupation, address, full name, medical 
searches, email address, and home phone number. The recipient in third, Score Card Research, 
got leaks from 18 sites but only received 7 distinct bits of private information. They are: city, zip, 
address, full name, medical searches, email, and home phone number. 
4.5 Summary 
Using the results of our study, we created a system of classification for the types of leaks we 
found. Broadly, we broke apart the leakage into two main types: direct leakage, which has bits of 
private information sent directly to the third party, and indirect leakage, which has a key sent to 
the third party that allows the third party gain access to a collection of person information about 
a user. The direct leakage was further broken into six types covering all the instances we saw. 
These types were: leakage via cookies, leakage via request URL, leakage via referer, leakage via 
title, leakage during signup, and leakage of search terms. Overall, we found leakage on 90 out of 
the 120 sites that we looked at, including instances of both direct and indirect leakage in every 
category that we looked at. As expected, categories that tended to contain sites with profiles 
tended to have a lot of indirect leakage, while categories that did not have many profiles had few 
such instances. 
We looked at the 67 sites that exhibited direct leakage in further analysis. When looking at 
which third parties got the most leaks, we found that a small minority of them received leaks 
from a large portion of the sites, but the large majority of third parties only received private 
information from a few different sites. When inspecting the bits that were leaked, we found that 
both bits that uniquely identify a user and those that do not got leaked with similar frequency. 
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5 Conclusions and Future Work 
Our hypothesis, that we are able to find leakage of private information on websites other than 
social networks, was confirmed by the results. By simply looking at HTTP headers, we were able 
to identify instances of information leakage on 75% of the sites that we looked at. In every 
category that we looked at, there were instances of both direct and indirect leakage. In almost 
every category, more than half the sites had leakage of some sort. These results are significant, 
especially since our findings are the lower bound of the leakage. There exists leakage that our 
methodology misses since we are only able to look at clear text leaks in the HTTP headers.  
There exist several ways that the methodology that we used for this study can be applied to a 
larger set of sites. The most obvious is to see if the same types of leakage that we saw in our 
categories also exist in other categories of sites. Our categories were chosen mainly to satisfy a 
requirement of popularity and fairness of selection. There are a number of categories that can be 
looked at that have interesting privacy implications or may have results that are different from 
ours. 
Another direction that the work can be taken is to follow the idea laid out in [3] and compare 
mobile sites to their full counterparts. There exist a number of sites on the Internet that have a 
full version, a mobile internet version, and an app for one or more cell phone operating systems. 
The three versions can be compared to see if they all exhibit the same types of leakage. It is 
possible that other types of leakage can be found which come about due to the properties of a 
mobile platform. 
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There exists a lot of work that can build upon our findings. One such idea is creating a tool to 
prevent the types of leakage that we found. Much of the direct leakage that we found could be 
prevented if the browser was aware of private information about the user. The browser could 
then look at what data is being sent to third party hosts and strip out any private information that 
would be leaked. The process is not perfect since not all possible patterns of leaks can be 
matched by a regular expression, but one could envision a tool with an acceptable error rate. It 
would get around some of the problems with current comparable tools, since the user would still 
have access to the same third party contents as an unprotected user, but the user would be 
protected from the types of leakage that we identified. 
Another security measure that could be implemented is identification of hidden third parties. 
The browser would then be able to treat them as third-party servers in regards to cookies and 
other security measures. To accomplish this task, the browser would need to do a reverse DNS 
lookup on all IPs that it sends data. It would also need to have some ways to differentiate a true 
hidden third party from a CDN or utility computing service. 
In addition, there exists work that we could not do for various reasons but could expand our 
work. One task is demonstrating the viability of harvesting information from indirect leakage. To 
do so, one would need to take the headers to a popular third party domain such as doubleclick or 
google-analytics and create a script to automatically search the logs for data that looks like a 
profile identifier. The script would then need to go to the page and see what data it could find. If 
such script were to be written (and there is no reason to say it cannot be), it would show that a 
malicious third party can harvest indirect leakage form many sites with minimal effort. 
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An additional follow up work is to look at how the leakage on a site changes over time. 
Features are constantly added to site and old features are redesigned. There is potential that the 
changes close up an avenue for data leakage, but it is also possible that the new feature also adds 
new leaks. Many sites also have advertising campaigns from any number of third parties. 
Different campaigns may end up leaking different data and they will most likely be leaking to 
different third parties. This type of study can also show us, if we look at long enough of a 
sample, if the amount of leakage is increasing or decreasing.  
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Appendices 
A. List of Sites in Each Category 
Arts 
youtube.com imdb.com deviantart.com movies.yahoo.com hulu.com scribd.com pandora.com 
last.fm veoh.com suite101.com 
 
Employment 
careerbuilder.com indeed.com monster.com jobsdb.com snagajob.com job.com quintcareers.com 
regionalhelpwanted.com vault.com employmentguide.com 
 
Video Game News and Reviews 
gamespot.com ign.com gamefaqs.com gametrailers.com gamesradar.com 1up.com gamespy.com 
gamershell.com eurogamer.net g4tv.com 
 
Photo Sharing 
ﬂickr.com photobucket.com imageshack.us imagevenue.com webshots.com shutterﬂy.com 
pbase.com snapﬁsh.com postimage.org kodakgallery.com 
 
News 
news.yahoo.com cnn.com nytimes.com weather.com huﬃngtonpost.com guardian.co.uk 
reuters.com timesoﬁndia.indiatimes.com washingtonpost.com latimes.com 
 
Travel 
tripadvisor.com expedia.com travelocity.com orbitz.com southwest.com kayak.com 
travel.yahoo.com delta.com aa.com easyjet.com 
 
Shopping 
amazon.com ebay.com walmart.com ikea.com target.com bestbuy.com newegg.com 
overstock.com homedepot.com barnesandnoble.com 
 
Relationships 
match.com matchmate.ca singlesnet.com friendﬁnder.com blackpeoplemeet.com rsvp.com.au 
ﬁlipinaheart.com cupid.com afrointroductions.com connectingsingles.com 
 
Generations and Age Groups 
aarp.org thirdage.com kidzworld.com teenspot.com student.com golivewire.com kiwibox.com 
seventeen.com girlsense.com sugarscape.com 
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Sports 
espn.go.com sports.yahoo.com cricinfo.com mlb.com goal.com foxsports.com cbssports.com 
nba.com nﬂ.com hattrick.org 
 
Online Social Networks 
twitter.com linkedin.com myspace.com livejournal.com orkut.com hi5.com bagdoo.com 
facebook.com stumbleupon.com tagged.com 
 
Health 
webmd.com mayoclinic.com mercola.com drugs.com menshealth.com medscape.com 
caloriecount.about.com weightwatchers.com kidshealth.org psychologytoday.com 
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B. Glossary 
All the terms below are defined in greater detail in the paper. This section serves as a quick 
reference to the terminology used in the paper for the convenience of the reader. 
 
Direct Leakage: Leakage during which one or more bits of private information is sent directly to 
a third party. This type of leakage includes leaking a user‘s name or address in some way. 
Hidden Third Party: A third party with a sub-domain on a trusted site domain name. 
Indirect Leakage: Leakage of data that is not in itself private information, but is information that 
can be used to access private information in some way. This type of leakage includes leaking 
a link to the user‘s profile. 
Leakage of Private Information: A disclosure of private information to a third party without the 
explicit request of the user to do so. 
Leakage During Signup: Leakage that occurs when a user is creating an account on a site. 
Leakage of Search Terms: Leakage of terms used by a user when searching a site. 
Leakage via Cookies: Leakage of information stored in cookies, generally due to a hidden third 
party. 
Leakage via Referer: Leakage of information when information is put into the URL of a site and 
that site acts as a referer for an object stored on a third-party server. 
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Leakage via Request URL: Leakage of information that occurs when information is included in 
the URL of a request going to a third party. 
Leakage via Title: Leakage of information that is being presented as part of a title of a page. 
OSN: Online Social Network, such as Facebook and MySpace. 
Private Information: Any information that either identifies an individual, can be linked to an 
individual, or that the individual would not like known. 
Private Information Bit: A datum of private information that the user can reveal and may get 
leaked. 
 
